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Introduction 
 
With the current National Road Safety Strategy [1] coming to the end of its term, it is 
timely to consider ways in which the next iteration of this strategy can be enhanced. 
Strategic planning should be a cyclic process in which learning and adaptation are 
just as important as planning and implementation.  It will always be the case that 
some actions are not as effective as expected, or that barriers to effective 
implementation will emerge.  Rather than being setbacks, these are opportunities for 
learning about the validity of our assumptions.  They are also opportunities for us to 
adapt to meet unanticipated or emerging challenges.  One of the positive aspects of 
the implementation of the first and second National Road Safety Strategies has been 
the willingness of road safety agencies to critically assess progress and to identify 
where and how actions would be better focused.  This has been reflected in the 
evolving nature of the periodic National Road Safety Action Plans.  
 
As the decade of the current Strategy reaches an end, there is a need to take this 
process further, and undertake a thorough critical evaluation of the Strategy 
development and implementation.  While not an attempt to be exhaustive, the 
following article will identify some key priorities for consideration as part of this 
process.  
 
The role of strategies and the need for a guiding vision 
 
Inevitably, the success of road safety strategies tends to be judged by the number of 
actions implemented and/or the extent to which crash reduction targets are achieved. 
However, it is important that such strategies do not merely become a collection of 
actions and targets. Johnston [2] has argued that to be effective road safety 
strategies need to address the often competing demands of the transport system. For 
example, the ongoing need for enhanced mobility, social justice and environmental 
sustainability may give rise to potential actions which can have a negative impact on 
road safety, such as calls for higher speed limits or fewer restrictions on road users. 
Hence, a road safety strategy needs to clearly identify the safety goals of the 
transport system relative to other outcomes, in order to promote coherent and 
consistent decision-making. 
 
Johnston [2] argues that to do this, road safety strategies require a guiding vision 
which among other things:  
 
 
 identifies what the „core‟ safety goals are for the future; 
 2 
 acknowledges the potential trade-offs that may need to be made between the 
competing demands of the transport system; 
 provides a foundation for the guiding principles and objectives within the 
strategy; and  
 identifies areas of accountability (particularly at the system-wide level).  
 
Over recent years, a number of potential guiding visions have emerged from other 
countries including Sweden‟s Vision Zero [3, 4] and the Dutch Sustainable Road 
Safety [5]. Similarly, the concept of danger reduction has been promoted by some as 
a vision for enhancing the safety and legitimacy of non-motorised road users [6]. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to critique these different guiding visions. However, a 
key common feature appears to be the way in which these guiding visions 
encapsulate and communicate the core safety goals of the system, even if they are 
aspirational in nature [7] and the need for system-wide action to achieve these goals. 
 
While the current National Road Safety Strategy does not explicitly state a guiding 
vision, it does include the following statement: “. . all safety measures that can be 
justified in terms of overall community benefits should be implemented” [1, p.3]. 
However, the strategy does not specify how these community benefits should be 
measured or assessed against the other goals of the transport system. This lack of a 
clear guiding vision was somewhat addressed by the adoption of the Safety Systems 
Framework in the National Road Safety Action Plan 2005 – 2006 [8]. This framework 
has placed a greater emphasis on the need for governments to strive for an overall 
safe road transport system and given greater focus to the need to better manage 
system-wide vehicle speeds. However, a more explicit guiding vision is arguably 
required in the next National Road Safety Strategy. 
 
Target setting 
 
The process for setting targets is always fraught, as there is a tension between taking 
account of what we can control versus what we cannot, and whether to set 
„comfortable‟ versus ambitious targets. More particularly, a number of developments 
over recent year have highlighted the challenges involved in setting ambitious 
targets. 
 
Firstly, the slowing rate of road fatality reductions in Australia has made it unlikely 
that the 5.6 deaths per 100,000 population target specified in the current strategy will 
be achieved. As acknowledged in the National Road Safety Action Plan 2009 and 
2010: “The average reduction achieved since the commencement of the NRSS has 
been 3.5 per cent per year. These figures suggest that reaching the target now 
presents a formidable challenge” [9, p.13].  
 
Secondly, it is inevitable that some jurisdictions or regions may face particular road 
safety challenges which will make it difficult to achieve ambitious targets in a uniform 
way. A good example of this relates to the major increase in motorcycle use that has 
occurred in Queensland over recent years, which has placed pressure on the state‟s 
road toll and seen the proportion of fatalities represented by this road user group rise 
from around 10% in 2000 to over 20% in recent years.  
 
Finally, it has been known for a long time that fluctuations in the economic cycle 
affect road safety by influencing levels of demand for travel (both work-related and 
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recreational) and other activities which influence road safety, such as alcohol 
consumption.  While it is possible to predict that swings in the cycle will occur, their 
amplitude and timing are not known with precision, and hence cannot easily be 
accommodated in the target-setting process.  Also, it is difficult to predict how 
governments will respond to economic downturns and how effective their actions will 
be. Indeed, recent experience suggests that economic stimulus packages may 
mitigate the impact of downturns on travel demand and hence safety outcomes. 
 
Together, these three factors may serve to discourage some decision-makers from 
setting ambitious targets in the future. This would be unfortunate, since a recent 
review of international best practice suggests that a results focus is critical to 
effective road safety programs and that this “requires setting targets and 
identifying the institutional means and interventions to achieve them” [7, p. 13]. More 
specifically, this review suggests that robust interim targets are necessary to 
complement more ambitious long term goals. 
 
The need to widen the scope of data sources and related targets 
 
As acknowledged in the current Strategy, it would be desirable to have a target for 
road injuries, as well as fatalities.  Indeed, it is unclear whether significant progress 
has been made towards reducing road injuries over the last decade.  One important 
barrier to target setting in this area is the reliance of transport agencies on police 
data rather than health data; another barrier is the difficulty of linking data and 
underreporting in both systems.  If it is not possible to set an injury target for the next 
Strategy, then at the least an action should be included which ensures that it will 
become possible during the life of the Strategy. 
 
The use of data sources other than police reported crashes has a wider relevance.  If 
we solely rely on data derived from crashes reported to police, we are systematically 
devaluing some road users, and arguably selling short the notion of a Safe System.  
This omission is clearest where pedestrians are concerned, as the only reportable 
crashes are those which result in collisions with a vehicle.  From a transport planning 
perspective, walking trips are a part of the overall transport system, both in their own 
right and because they provide connectivity between other modes of transport.  The 
infrastructure for walking is provided and maintained by the same agencies that 
provide and maintain infrastructure for motorised vehicles and cyclists, yet the trips 
and falls which results from poorly maintained or absent pedestrian infrastructure are 
not included in our approach to road safety.  This is especially important as the 
population ages; greater numbers of older drivers will give up driving (voluntarily or 
involuntarily) and walk to public transport stops.  The greater fragility of older people 
makes them vulnerable to falls – a hip fracture can be fatal – so that the benefits of 
reducing driving by “unfit” older people may be reduced or even overtaken by the 
costs of falls due to increased pedestrian activity [10]. Similar arguments apply to 
other crashes currently ruled out by the requirement for police reportability, e.g. at 
locations which do not meet the classification of a “road”. 
 
Should such a step be taken (widening the scope of road use), it begs the question 
as to how the setting of targets would be affected.  It is suggested that the fatality 
target could continue to use the police-reported data, while acknowledging that a 
Safe System has other indicators of safety which can be addressed. 
 
 4 
Links to other Strategies 
 
Inevitably, road safety competes for public and media attention with other health, 
social and environmental issues of concern. In this regard, it is important that road 
safety doesn‟t become too insular and fail to capitalise on other „moods for change‟ 
within the community. For example, environmental concerns associated with climate 
change provide an opportunity for road safety agencies to promote the benefits of 
lower vehicle speeds, which will not only enhance safety but reduce vehicle 
emissions. While this is somewhat of a simplistic example, it illustrates the synergistic 
effects that could be achieved by linking road safety improvements to other 
contemporary issues of concern. Hence, it is essential that the next National Road 
Safety Strategy is not a stand-alone document, which only has relevance to those in 
the field. Rather, wherever possible it needs to acknowledge and address the goals 
inherent in other transport, health and environmental strategies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Over the last two decades, Australia has experienced major improvements in road 
safety. The first and second National Road Safety Strategies have arguably played a 
key role in achieving these improvements, by harnessing and directing our efforts at 
both the national and state level. However, road safety improvements appear to be 
plateauing and a concerted effort is required to make further gains. There is no 
simple solution to this problem. It requires a coordinated an integrated approach, 
involving the adoption of a long-term ambitious goal for road safety, the development 
of ambitious but robust interim targets, and an increased investment in road safety 
improvements. The next National Road Safety Strategy represents the ideal vehicle 
by which to articulate, communicate and plan these improvements.  
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